RUK Vulnerabilities over Russia

Reform UK and Farage are vulnerable with voters over Russia in several ways.

Nathan Gill, Nigel Farage and Russia

Probably the biggest vulnerability is the Nathan Gill/ Nigel Farage/ Russia scandal. Former UKIP MEP and ex-Reform UK Wales leader Nathan Gill was sentenced at the Old Bailey to 10.5 years in prison for accepting Russian bribes. Read more details here. (add link)

After the conviction of Nigel Farage ally Nathan Gill for taking Russian bribes, investigations have expanded to determine how many former UKIP/Brexit Party MEPs were also compromised. Eight are currently under investigation.

The Nathan Gill bribery scandal raises questions about RUK’s connection to Russia. We need the British media to be asking Farage and RUK questions about it and hold RUK to account. The key question is whether Farage was contacted by Russia in relation to bribes or not. He does not want to be asked this as he was likely contacted, so we want a definitive yes or no: either answer is dangerous for him.

Farage attempted to weakly distance himself from Trump and Putin during the 2025 local elections.

The Nathan Gill scandal’s impact

Click here for a full breakdown of the Nathan Gill Russia bribes scandal

What shows us that this is a sore point for RUK?

  1. When the scandal broke, Reform UK leadership denied knowing Gill, then was forced to backtrack.
  1. Farage has gone from gently praising Putin in the past to calling for NATO to shoot down Russia planes. Farage has a history of being anti-NATO, blaming it for the Ukrainian war so this quite a shift.
  1. The 2025 Caerphilly by-election saw Nathan Gill’s bribery scandal become a significant factor, impacting the Reform UK campaign and contributing to the party’s eventual defeat.

Impact on the Caerphilly by-election

  • Spotlight on Reform UK: The scandal overshadowed Reform UK’s campaign, which had initially been favoured to win based on strong polling numbers. The bribery conviction and Powell’s association with Gill became a central talking point for opposition parties.
  • Opposition attacks:
    • First Minister Eluned Morgan called on Powell to explain what he knew about Gill’s actions.
    • Labour and Plaid Cymru candidates publicly condemned Gill and questioned Powell’s knowledge of the situation.
  • Reform UK’s defence:
    • Llŷr Powell condemned his former boss’s actions as a “complete and utter betrayal,” stating he had no knowledge of the bribery and had left Gill’s staff before the crimes occurred.
    • Nigel Farage publicly distanced the party from Gill, calling him a “bad apple” who betrayed his trust and was “deeply shocked” by the revelations.
    • The party dismissed the attacks as a “desperate smear campaign” by Labour.
  • Resulting political dynamic: The scandal, along with the tactical voting of anti-Reform voters, proved detrimental to Reform UK’s chances. While Reform UK finished in a strong second place with a massive increase in its vote share, Plaid Cymru ultimately won the seat.
  • Caerphilly Reform UK candidate distances himself from Gill and deleted social media posts.

Farage’s Pro-Russia 2024 general election comments

During the 2024 general election, support for Nigel Farage’s Reform UK dipped following his claim that the West provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A BMG poll shows Reform falling from 19% to 16%, while the Conservatives edged up to 20% and Labour held a strong lead at 42%. A YouGov poll also recorded a slight drop for Reform. Farage repeated his Ukraine comments despite cross-party criticism.

Farage has been quiet on the subject since his ill-judged interview during the 2024 election campaign in which he claimed Russia had been provoked into attacking Ukraine. It halted Reform’s momentum during the campaign and may have been the critical factor in keeping the Conservatives as the official opposition ahead of the Liberal Democrats.

Farage and Reform UK links to Russia

Link to Russia interference in British politics – google doc

This is a damning article in the Bylines Times that illustrates Farage’s close connections to Russia. It asks five key questions. https://bylinetimes.com/2024/06/19/the-five-questions-nigel-farage-is-never-asked-about-brexit-trump-and-russia/ 

1. Why Did Farage Lie About Meeting the Russian Ambassador?

2. How Could Farage Not Have Known About Arron Banks’ Multiple Visits to the Russian Embassy During the Brexit Campaign? 

3. What Did Farage Know About the Russian Hacking of the Clinton Campaign?

4. How Could Farage be Blind to Trump and Steve Bannon’s Backing for Russia? 

5. Why Did Farage Hide the Assessment that his Leave.EU Campaign Funder was an “Agent of Russian Influence?”

In a TV interview Reform UK’s Zia Yusef  struggled to defend Nigel Farage’s claim that “the West provoked the war,” especially after ex-Reform figure Nathan Gill was jailed for taking Russian bribes. In a tense TV interview, the party’s policy chief repeatedly refused to say Farage was wrong, dodging simple yes/no questions and relying on decade-old “context.” His evasions suggest a fear of contradicting Farage, reinforcing perceptions that Reform is soft on Russia. Although he dismissed Gill as irrelevant, refusing to repudiate Farage effectively makes the comment party policy. This stance is politically damaging, especially for a party currently leading in polls.

Farage said he admired Putin in 2014

Farage said: “I was asked a couple of months ago which world leader did I admire and I said Vladimir Putin as an operator, particularly the way he managed to stop the West getting militarily involved in Syria, but I don’t like him, I wouldn’t want to live there and I don’t like him as a human being. But I’m sure there will be a ding-dong over that.”

Nigel Farage’s sympathetic stance toward Russia dates back years. In 2014, amid Russia’s annexation of Crimea, he declared Vladimir Putin the world leader he most admired—not for moral reasons, but for his perceived skill as a political “operator” who had outmanoeuvred Western powers.

Although Farage later criticised Putin’s human rights record, his remarks reflected an admiration for authoritarian strength over liberal diplomacy.

So Farage said he doesn’t like Putin as a human being but as an operator. Putin is an authoritarian dictator so it is very weird for a British politician and MP to say they admire him at all. He could have picked anyone but chose Putin. And as the article says, he hasn’t disavowed his own comment since. This article clarifies that Farage was making these comments in relation to state foreign policy, but it also points out that in none of the 17 times Farage appeared on Russia Today did Farage criticise Russia’s (lack of) democracy.

Following Led By Donkey’s 2024 stunt linking Farage to Putin, at an event where Farage was speaking, Farage showed himself to be thin-skinned, got angry and called for someone to get the sack. If Farage doesn’t care about being linked to Putin, why did he react in this way?

A remote-controlled screen operated by the political activist group, Led By Donkeys, lowers as Reform UK leader Nigel Farage speaks at a campaign rally at the Columbine Centre in Walton-on-the-Naze, Britain, June 29, 2024. LED BY DONKEYS /Handout via REUTERS

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, he attempted to distance himself from his earlier comments, calling Putin “the devil we know”. Farage denies praising Putin despite 2014 comments — The Guardian

Farage met the Russia Ambassador in 2013

Farage met Alexander Yakovenko, the Russian Ambassador to the UK at the time, on 13 May 2013, with the Russian Embassy even posting an official photo of Yakovenko greeting him. Farage later denied the meeting, despite the photographic evidence documenting it. This has led many to ask a pointed question: why was Farage engaging with a senior Russian diplomat at exactly the moment Moscow was ramping up efforts to influence Eurosceptic and nationalist movements in the West?

Farage appeared on Russia-controlled Russia Today 17 times before 2014

  • Farage frequently appeared on Russian state-controlled media RT while serving as an MEP.
  • Reports suggest he received payment for these appearances.
  • Farage stated the payments were minor, totaling under £5,000, and none were received after March 2017.

By 2014, he had appeared at least 17 times on RT, and in 2016, the channel offered him his own show, which he reportedly declined, though he discussed other roles such as covering the US presidential election. Farage defended his appearances by claiming RT was simply a broadcaster with an audience, despite acknowledging its political agenda.

RT, however, has been sanctioned repeatedly by Ofcom for breaching impartiality rules, and Putin himself confirmed that RT represents the Russian government’s official stance. Despite this, and amid controversies like the Skripal poisonings, the UK government was notably muted about Russia’s broader interference activities.

In short: Farage’s media income surged alongside his appearances on the Kremlin-backed RT, highlighting his financial and professional links to Russian state media during a period of intensified Russian influence operations.

UKIP publicly rejected claims that Farage was negotiating a TV deal with the Russian state broadcaster, despite reports suggesting discussions had occurred.

The UK government banned RT in 2022

How RT operates

Summary: RT, UKIP, and Payments Linked to the Kremlin

RT (Russia Today) is a state-controlled Russian broadcaster, fully funded and directed by the Kremlin as part of its foreign policy strategy. Its content is overseen by top officials such as Aleksey Gromov, a senior Kremlin figure who coordinates media messaging. RT’s mission, according to its Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan, is explicitly political — to “conquer the audience” and spread Russian state messaging globally, especially during times of conflict.

RT’s Payment Structure and UK Connections

  • RT claims not to pay guests directly, but instead uses “independent production companies” such as Studio Sixty Billion, which produces programmes for RT UK (notably Sam Delaney’s News Thing).
  • These companies are in turn funded by RT, meaning any appearance fee from them ultimately originates from the Kremlin.
  • Studio Sixty Billion, directed by Sam Delaney, has paid multiple British MPs and peers for TV appearances between 2015 and 2017, including David Davies, Nigel Evans, Simon Danczuk, Johnny Mercer, David Lammy, Mike Freer, Rosie Duffield, and Lord Prescott.
  • Recorded payments to public officials total around £9,000, representing direct Kremlin-linked funds reaching UK politicians.

Nigel Farage and UKIP

  • Nigel Farage and other UKIP figures were questioned about receiving payments from RT.
    • Gerard Batten denied being paid; Farage did not respond.
    • Farage was a frequent guest on RT, appearing at least 17 times between 2010–2014, with insiders claiming he was paid around £2,000 per appearance.
  • Farage’s company, Thorn in the Side Ltd, shows a sharp increase in income during this period — from £9,737 in 2012 to over £76,000 by 2014, aligning with his RT appearances.
  • Reports suggest his outside media earnings exceeded €10,000 per month, with at least £60,000 annually from undisclosed sources.

Production Company and Denials

  • Studio Sixty Billion was incorporated in 2015, producing RT shows with funds directly allocated from Moscow.
  • Its spokesperson admitted they were “contracted to make shows for RT” with budgets provided by RT, while refusing to disclose who was paid or how much.

Key Implications

  • Appearances on RT by UK politicians and media figures — including Farage — amount to financial and operational engagement with a Kremlin state actor.
  • Through intermediaries like Studio Sixty Billion, Kremlin funds flowed to British public figures, embedding Russian influence within UK political and media circles.
  • As one insider put it, the investigation was “looking for a smoking gun” — and the evidence shows that RT’s money trail leads directly from the Kremlin to UK public life.

Farage’s pro-Russian talking points and worldview

Nigel Farage’s frequent appearances on RT (Russia Today), a Kremlin-controlled outlet known for spreading disinformation, as evidence of his alignment with Russian narratives. Farage dismisses these concerns as political smears, claiming his positions reflect pragmatic realism. However, his tendency to echo Kremlin talking points continues to raise questions about why his rhetoric so often mirrors Russia’s worldview.

Farage has repeatedly echoed Kremlin narratives, including the claim that NATO and EU expansion provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a position widely condemned in the UK.

On the eve of the 2022 invasion and afterwards, Farage continued to push narratives that echo Kremlin talking points: urging negotiation with Putin, downplaying sanctions, and describing NATO/EU expansion as a cause of war.

Farage is inconsistent on Russia, initially excusing or explaining Putin’s actions and later advocating direct military retaliation. Farage flips his positions for political reasons, possibly because Trump and public opinion have shifted, rather than on principle.

Sanctions on Russia

Farage has argued that sanctions on Russia “don’t work,” claiming they harm British households more than Russia. Between 2022 and 2023, he suggested that Russia merely “found other buyers” for its energy exports. However, independent analyses indicate that sanctions have reduced Russia’s oil and gas revenues, limited its access to Western technology, and slowed long-term economic growth.

Reform UK donors Russian links

Reform UK’s ecosystem—spanning Farage’s pro-Russia rhetoric, wealthy donors with opaque finances, and media partners amplifying divisive themes—reflects a troubling convergence with Kremlin-aligned disinformation goals. Even without direct control, this alignment erodes trust in democracy, weakens Western alliances, and fuels domestic division, ultimately harming the very electorate the party claims to champion.

Chris Harborne (aka Chakrit Sakunkrit) – Reform UK’s largest donor, Harborne’s business dealings in aviation fuel and cryptocurrency intersect with industries tied to Russian financial networks. His offshore accounts were revealed in the Panama Papers and his alleged role in helping Tether evade U.S. banking rules raise questions about money flows possibly connected to Russian-linked entities.

Jeremy Hosking – Another major donor, Hosking has funded multiple Brexit campaigns, including Leave.EU and Vote Leave, both accused of echoing Russian disinformation themes. His anti-EU rhetoric and opaque financial practices reinforce narratives that benefit Moscow’s goal of undermining European unity.

George Farmer – The former Parler CEO’s use of Russian-based servers and his involvement in far-right media amplify Kremlin-style messaging. His projects, like Turning Point UK, promote anti-climate and anti-globalist narratives, echoing disinformation aimed at fracturing Western cohesion. His ties through marriage to U.S. commentator Candace Owens connect him to similar ideological networks.

Media Influence – GB News

Platforms such as GB News, a major outlet for Reform UK figures, have financial backers (notably Christopher Chandler and Paul Marshall) with historic business ties to Russian markets. Its editorial stance—focused on culture wars, anti-immigration, and climate skepticism—often parallels key Kremlin disinformation themes

Narrative and Digital Patterns

Reform UK’s online messaging—emphasizing anti-globalism, distrust of institutions, and immigration fears—closely aligns with Russian influence strategies. While no proof of coordinated bot activity exists, its social media amplification patterns resemble Russian troll farm tactics used to polarize public debate

Arron Banks, a key Farage ally with strong Russia links

Banks and Mellon’s Russia business dealings

Billionaire Jim Mellon built wealth in 1990s Russia, investing in state-linked companies and co-founding Charlemagne Capital. He introduced Arron Banks to Nigel Farage, aiding Leave.EU’s launch. While no illegal activity is proven, their financial ties to Russian-linked ventures raise concerns about potential influence on Brexit and UK politics.

Farage, Arron Banks, and Russian Embassy Links

Arron Banks, UKIP’s key funder and Leave.EU leader, exchanged emails and met Russian officials multiple times in 2015–2016, discussing deals including Russian gold, diamond assets, and Sberbank. While Banks downplayed these as casual encounters, court evidence suggests extensive contacts. Nigel Farage, who benefited from Banks’ £8 million campaign funding and additional personal support, claims he was unaware of Banks’ Russian interactions. The documented meetings raise questions about Farage’s knowledge and the potential influence of Russian engagement on the Brexit campaign.

Farage downplays Banks meetings Russia ambassador

Nigel Farage admitted that he was invited to a meeting with Arron Banks, Andy Wigmore, and the Russian ambassador but said he declined to attend. Speaking on his LBC show, he acknowledged knowing that Banks and Wigmore had met the ambassador but claimed he was unaware of any subsequent meetings or discussions about Russian gold mining deals.

Farage appeared to downplay concerns, noting that Banks was “married to a Russian” and insisting there was no evidence that Banks’s Russian connections influenced the Brexit referendum.

His remarks followed a Sunday Times investigation that exposed an “extensive web of links” between Banks’s Leave.EU campaign and Russian officials, raising renewed questions about Moscow’s potential influence on the Brexit vote.

Banks previously admitted only one meeting in 2015; emails indicate at least three meetings and a lunch in November 2016, shortly after he, Wigmore, and Nigel Farage met Donald Trump in New York.

The meetings were reportedly facilitated by Alexander Udod, later expelled as a suspected Russian intelligence officer after the Skripal poisoning.

Banks’s Response: He downplayed the meetings, insisting Russian officials did not seek to influence Leave.EU’s campaign.

Banks denied visiting Russia in 2015-16

Arron Banks, a major Brexit donor, allegedly met Russian officials in early 2016, though he denies being in Russia. Conflicting emails and explanations from his aide Andy Wigmore raise doubts. Under investigation by UK authorities, Banks insists meetings were legitimate, but discrepancies fuel concerns about potential Russian influence on the Leave campaign.

Arron Banks’s dodgy business dealings

  • Arron Banks, major Brexit donor and Leave.EU backer, has faced scrutiny over his business activities and alleged sources of funding for his political donations.
  • The investigation by Channel 4 News draws on police files in South Africa and statements from his former business partner, Chris Kimber, revealing allegations involving diamonds, guns, and Russian cash.
  • Russian links: Documents claim Banks sought financial help from Russia, specifically the state diamond company Alrosa, for his struggling African diamond mines. He allegedly traveled to Russia in 2015 to discuss investment opportunities in diamonds and gold. Banks denies these claims, saying no deals took place.
  • Diamond business: Banks owns mines in South Africa and Lesotho, including the Sebapala mine. Allegations include illicit diamond trading and mismanagement; employees report extremely low pay and no significant diamond recovery. Banks claims the operations are exploration-only and profitable finds are limited but ongoing.
  • Bribery allegations: Emails suggest Banks made cash and bank payments (approx. £19,000 total) to Lesotho politician John Maseribane, allegedly to secure a mining licence. Both deny these payments were bribes, claiming they were campaign or personal support. Maseribane denies lobbying occurred.
  • Mercenary claims: Chris Kimber alleged Banks considered providing mercenary support to maintain political allies in Lesotho; no evidence of mercenary activity was found. Emails indicate discussions about a shooting range and firearms at his mines for security purposes.
  • Financial strain and diversion of funds: Court documents suggest Banks raised money for mining projects but allegedly diverted some funds to Brexit-related activities. He denies any connection between Russian investment and Brexit funding. Proposed bonds for his mines were never executed.
  • Political fallout: MPs, including Damian Collins, argue these revelations raise serious questions about Banks’ relationship with Russia and the sources of his Brexit funding, as well as the accuracy of his disclosures to Parliament.
  • Banks dismisses all allegations as “fake news” and maintains his mining operations and charitable contributions in Lesotho are legitimate.

This investigation portrays Banks as a controversial figure whose business dealings, alleged Russian contacts, and political donations are deeply intertwined, raising unresolved questions about transparency and influence.

Why Did Farage Hide that His Leave.EU Funder was an “Agent of Russian Influence”?

By 2018, evidence showed Arron Banks’ extensive Kremlin contacts, with journalist Isabel Oakeshott warning he might be a Russian agent. Likely informed, Farage took no action and never acknowledged interference. His silence and denial suggest negligence or willful blindness, raising serious questions about his role in enabling Russian influence during Brexit.

Russia interference in the Brexit campaign through Banks

Investigations by the Sunday Times and Observer revealed potential Russian influence on the 2016 Brexit referendum through Leave campaign donor Arron Banks. The reports suggest Banks’ financial and personal links to Russia, combined with repeated meetings with officials, warranted scrutiny over whether the Kremlin sought to influence the Brexit vote.:

  • Banks, along with Nigel Farage and Andy Wigmore, had early contact with Donald Trump’s transition team and reportedly passed contacts to Russian officials.
  • The report connects these events to ongoing U.S. investigations by Robert Mueller, as Banks and Farage had overlapping contacts with Russian officials and Trump campaign figures.
  • Banks and Wigmore appeared before the UK parliamentary Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee to answer questions about Russian contacts, the £9 million Leave campaign funding, and potential Kremlin influence on the referendum.
  • Damian Collins, committee chair, stressed the revelations raised serious concerns about Russian interference in UK democracy.

Andy Wigmore, another Farage ally with Russia links

Andy Wigmore has a close relationship with Nigel Farage, having worked as the director of communications for the Leave.EU campaign, which Farage led during the Brexit referendum. Their partnership has been marked by significant political activities, including meetings with key figures in the U.S. and alleged connections to Russian officials.

Relationship Between Nigel Farage and Andy Wigmore

Background

  • Nigel Farage is a prominent British politician known for leading the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Brexit Party. 
  • Andy Wigmore is a British-Belizean political activist and former diplomat who served as the director of communications for the Leave.EU campaign, which was closely associated with Farage. 

Key Connections

Diplomatic Role and Controversies

  • Wigmore held a diplomatic position as a trade, commercial, and press attaché at the Belize High Commission in London. His role ended in January 2017 after a controversial meeting with then President-elect Donald Trump, raising questions about his conduct as a diplomat. 
  • He faced allegations of misleading Parliament regarding his interactions with Russian officials, which further complicated his relationship with Farage and the Leave.EU campaign. 

Recent Developments

  • Wigmore has been involved in various controversies, including accusations of sending abusive messages to journalists and his connections to Russian officials, which have drawn scrutiny to his and Farage’s activities during and after the Brexit campaign. 

This relationship highlights the intertwining of political activism, diplomacy, and controversy in the context of Brexit and its aftermath

Farage and Gill’s links to Russian intelligence

Oleh Voloshyn and Nadia Sass

Farage and Gill’s links to Voloshyn and Sass

  • Oleh Voloshyn, Nathan Gill’s paymaster, was closely linked to Viktor Medvedchuk, a top Putin ally in Ukraine. Voloshyn has been charged in the UK with bribing former UK politician Nathan Gill to make pro-Kremlin statements as an MEP. He was accused of paying Nathan Gill undisclosed sums of money to make pro-Kremlin statements in the European parliament. Read more about the Nathan Gill bribery scandal here (add link)
  • Voloshyn’s wife, Nadia Borodi (aka Nadia Sass), worked for Medvedchuk’s Channel 112 and has been described as a “Russian propagandist.”
  • Within six days of receiving his first bribe, Gill spoke in the EU Parliament on 12 December 2018, defending Medvedchuk’s TV channels and criticizing Ukraine for threatening to ban them.
  • Gill did not disclose that he was being paid by Voloshyn/Medvedchuk associates and later gave an interview with Borodi outside the EU Parliament.
  • Nadia Sass (also known as Nadia Borodi) is a TV host and broadcaster, who posed for a photo of Farage at the European Parliament in 2024 and she posted on twitter/x about sending Farage a pro Brexit t-shirt in 2018.
  • The timing suggests Gill’s statements directly aligned with pro-Kremlin interests, raising questions about Farage’s claim of being unaware.
  • Critics argue it is implausible Farage did not know about Gill defending Medvedchuk’s channels, given the proximity and photographic evidence.

Sass’s response to Carole Cadwalladr

  • Cadwalladr emailed Sass for comment; Sass replied with a long email focused not on the espionage allegations but on Nigel Farage.
  • Sass claims Farage is not a friend—merely a “handsome and stylish English gentleman” she asked for a photo like “thousands of other ladies.”
  • She says the second Farage photo (of him holding a Brexit-themed T-shirt) was part of a small T-shirt business she tried to promote, denying any political relationship.
  • She does not address being labelled a “Kremlin agent of influence,” nor her husband’s activities.

Missing answers and strange timing

In 2019 Farage and Brexit Party MEPs voted against stronger EU measures to counter Russia disinformation

Brexit 

In October 2019, Brexit Party MEPs opposed proposals in the European Parliament to bolster the EU’s response to Russian disinformation. At the time, MEP David Bull argued that claims of Russian interference were “baseless propaganda” and merely “scare stories” used to silence discussion. Bull now serves as the chair of Reform UK.

“In October 2019, Brexit Party members in the European Parliament voted against stronger EU measures aimed at countering Russian disinformation. One of them, David Bull MEP, explained at the time: “Stories of Russian interference have been exposed as baseless propaganda and scare stories used to shut down debate.” Bull is now chair of Reform UK.